



Registrar

National Electric Power Regulatory Authority Islamic Republic of Pakistan

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No. NEPRA/DG(M&E)/LAD-02/ 18905

December 05, 2024

Chief Executive Officer
Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited (IESCO),
Street 40, G-7/4, Islamabad

**SUBJECT: ORDER OF THE AUTHORITY IN THE MATTER OF SHOW CAUSE NOTICE
ISSUED TO IESCO UNDER SECTION 27B OF NEPRA ACT ON ACCOUNT OF
NON-FATAL ACCIDENT OF AYESHA BIBI, RESIDENT OF MANNU NAGAR
KACHHI ABADI, HASAN ABDAL, DISTRICT, ATTOCK, IESCO**

Please find enclosed herewith the Order of the Authority (total 11 pages) in the subject matter for information and compliance.

Enclosure: As above

Wasim Anwar Bhinder
(Wasim Anwar Bhinder)

National Electric Power Regulatory Authority



ORDER


IN THE MATTER OF SHOW CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO IESCO UNDER SECTION 27B OF NEPRA ACT ON ACCOUNT OF NON-FATAL ACCIDENT OF AEYSHA BIBI, RESIDENT OF MANNU NAGAR KACHHI ABADI, HASAN ABDAL, DISTRICT ATTOCK, IESCO.

1. Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited (IESCO) (the "Licensee") was granted a Distribution License (No. 01/DL/2023) by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (the "Authority") on 06.04.2023, for providing Distribution Services in its Service Territory as stipulated in its said Distribution License, pursuant to section 20 read with 21 of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 ("NEPRA Act").

Background:

2. NEPRA was in receipt of an application dated 30.10.2023 filed by Mr. Mohammad Irfan (father of the victim girl). In his application, he submitted that he is a poor resident of Mohalla Kachi Abadi, Mannu Nagar, Hasan Abdal, District Attock. He highlighted that 11kV lines passing over his house were loose and sagging heavily and thus the walls of his house and street have been electrified frequently, and current is produced in them. He further mentioned that a number of animals have been affected due to this electrification in the past and despite his repeated pleas to sub-divisional office of the Licensee in both written and verbal forms, no action was taken by the officers/officials of the Licensee, and instead, they advised him to wrap plastic bottles on walls of house.
3. Moreover, he contended that on 02nd August, 2023, he again visited SDO office of the Licensee, and submitted an application explaining the heavy winds & rainfall since the previous week which were causing the said 11kV lines to swing dangerously and produce current resulting in a fire. However, again, no notice was taken by SDO office of the Licensee. Mr. Irfan went on to submit that on 08th of August, 2023 at 05:00pm, his 08 years old daughter namely Ayesha Bibi was collecting vegetables from the field. Suddenly a strong wind blew and caused the 11 kV conductors to swing, resulting in a short circuit and subsequent generation of an arc flash. Unfortunately, this arc flash fell on both of the victim's arms resulting in severe burns and loss of consciousness. She was immediately shifted to the hospital, where doctors had to amputate both of her arms in order to save her life resulting in a tragic and permanent disability.
4. He categorically blamed Mr. Naqeebullah – SDO, and other line staff namely, Mr. Sher Afzal, Mr. Mohammad Naeem, Mr. Sajid of the Licensee as being responsible for the occurrence of the said accident due to their negligence. He requested that departmental proceedings be initiated against these officers/officials. Lastly, he prayed that following compensation may be provided:

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- Provision of prosthetic and functional arms for the victim by IESCO;
- Issuance of a reasonable stipend for victim on monthly basis by IESCO;
- Provision of job on the disabled persons' quota in IESCO when the victim comes of age;
- Arrangement of a suitable life insurance policy for the victim by IESCO.

Proceedings:


5. The incident raised serious concerns regarding the safety and effectiveness of the Licensee's distribution network and its ability to supply electricity while fully adhering to its statutory and license obligations. The Authority took serious notice of incident and therefore, constituted an investigation Committee (IC) under section 27A of the NEPRA Act to conduct investigation against the Licensee on possible violations of the NEPRA Act, Rules, Regulations, and Codes made thereunder and conditions of license. A notice regarding investigation and constitution of IC in the said matter was issued to the Licensee under section 27A of NEPRA Act, vide letter dated 19.12.2023.
6. The IC visited the Licensee's sub division office in Hasan Abdal on December 12, 2023 and conducted a meeting with the Licensee's concerned officials. IC also visited the site and met with victim's family, neighbours, and eye witnesses. After conducting due investigation, the committee submitted its report based on facts and findings. The Authority considered the report and directed that a Show Cause Notice be issued to the Licensee under section 27B of the NEPRA Act on account of violation of NEPRA Act, terms & conditions of license, NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, Distribution Code, Power Safety Code, Consumer Service Manual and other applicable documents.

Show Cause Notice

7. NEPRA vide letter dated March 20, 2024, issued a Show Cause Notice (SCN) to the Licensee. The salient points of the SCN are as follows:

5. WHEREAS, in terms of the investigation report, on the day of accident, Ayesha Bibi and her father were present in the plot to collect vegetables. While Irfan was harvesting sponge gourd (turai) at west side of plot, and Ayesha was playing inside near the main gate with the cut sponge gourd (turai) at east side. 11 kV conductors were passing just where Ayesha was playing. Since the conductors were loose and have high sag, hanging very close to the boundary wall, therefore, caused induced voltage. Due to strong wind on Aug 8, 2023 at around 5 PM, the loose and hanging 11kV conductors swung and were short circuited due to the phase-to-phase contact. This resulted in generation of an arc flash and sparks fell down at ground near to Ayesha Bibi. Although the girl was not in direct physical contact with the energized conductors, but her hands, which were relatively close to the arc flash/generated sparks, were burnt. However, her face and the rest of her body remained unaffected; and

6. WHEREAS, the feeder data indicated that there was no tripping occurred on the day of the accident. An outdated electromechanical CDG (Controlled Directional Gear) relay was installed on the feeder at the time of accident for tripping in case of overcurrent and earth fault. The CDG relay was replaced after accident with a digital protection relay. Verification at the site did not confirm whether the CDG relay was functioning correctly at the time of the accident as IESCO failed to prove



the same. This raises the possibility of a defect or bypass. It further appears that the CDG relay's protection scheme and trip setting were not configured to a level sufficient for fault detection or were configured incorrectly; and

7. **WHEREAS**, according to the medical admission and discharge report, the child Ayesha Bibi received severe injuries from high voltage (11 kV arc flash), resulting in severe burns with extensive-deep damage affecting bones, multiple tissues, muscles, and organs. The visual evidence from Ayesha's pictures strongly indicates that the injury is not consistent with low voltage (220 volts). The severity of the accident led to significant medical consequences for the victim, including the amputation of her both arms to save her life. Thus, she is permanently disabled for the rest of her life; and

8. **WHEREAS**, Mr. Muhammad Irfan (Father of Victim) during Khuli Kacheri on Aug. 02, 2023 in both verbal and written brought into the knowledge of Officers/Officials of Sub-Division Hasan Abdal, regarding the Sagging of 11 kV and causing leakage current. However, appropriate corrective actions were not taken by the licensee which resulted in the tragic accident; and

9. **WHEREAS**, during the course of the investigation, the local watchman (Chowkidar) namely Mohammad Shafiq informed that the line had been adjusted and tightened for proper tension in the early morning after the accident. As per victim's father, loose sag was corrected after the accident by IESCO. When IC visited the site, minimum clearances for 11 kV overhead bare conductors from the ground surface was found within the limit. However, the pictures before the accident indicates less clearance which strengthens the stance of victim's father and an eye witness; and


10. **WHEREAS**, the Licensee has failed to comply with Rule 4(g) of Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, Clause SR 4 of Safety Management Criteria, Clauses DDC 2.2 & 3 of Distribution Design Code and Clause SC-1 System Construction Code of Distribution Code, Clause 7.14 of Power Safety Code for Licensees, 2021 and Chapter 12 of Consumer Service Manual; and

11. **NOW THEREFORE**, in view of the above, the Licensee is hereby served with a Show Cause Notice and directed to submit reply within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of this Show Cause Notice as to why a penalty up to maximum of Rs. 200,000,000/- (Two Hundred Million) plus a further penalty up to Rs. 100,000/- for each day of default, should not be imposed on you.

Submissions of the Licensee:

8. In response, the Licensee vide its letter dated April 20, 2024 submitted its reply against the served Show Cause Notice. A summary of the Licensee's response is as follows:

“ 5. The aforesaid alleged tragic occurrence on dated 08.08.2023 came into the knowledge of IESCO through its Operation Circle, Attock as reported in social media on 02.10.2023. Afterwards IESCO adopted the adequate, efficacious and prudent legal recourses by initiating investigation regarding the occurrence through its officials of the safety directorate and visited the place of occurrence but victim's father did not cooperate with the investigation team by denying access to the place of reported occurrence, and provision of medical reports. Subsequently,



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on directions of the Secretary, Ministry of Energy, a committee for probing the alleged occurrence was constituted by Power Planning & Monitoring Company (PPMC) vide its letter no. 217-18 dated 07.11.2023, in respect of which, PPMC furnished Inquiry Report dated 28.02.2024 concluding portion thereof is reiterated below for ready reference, convenience and brevity:

"The committee concluded that Ayesha Bibi did suffer a severe electric shock from 11kV line, leading to amputation of both arms. However, her father concealed the fact that she was sitting on the ground when the flash occurred, which contradicted the extent of her injuries, as she had received a direct electric shock from the line as described in the medical report that she received electric shock from the main wires... .."

6. With regards to the functioning of CDG Relay the XEN P&I IESCO submitted his report and is reproduced below:

11 KV O/G Islampura is emanating from 132KV GSS New Wah, 11KV O/G panel is Faizi Industries Make and Year of manufacturing of panel is 1993 and the said feeder was commissioned/energized on 14-01-1994 and the Protection O/C + E/F Relay since commissioning was GE Make CDG-61 type. The said relay (CDG-61) was approved by System Protection NTDC Lahore for the protection of equipment.

Annual maintenance shutdown was carried out properly, the said relay was tested during every shutdown with Secondary Injection Test Set and tripping confirmed through VCB and found satisfactory. The said relay tripped regularly in case of fault occurred on the feeder and tripping record for the last 03 Months. IESCO procured Digital Type O/C + E/F Relays and same relays were allocated to SS&TL Division vide allocation order No. 3174-79 dated 31-08-2023 and relays were drawn from Regional Store New Wah during the month of September-2023.



The 11kV O/G Islampura Feeder relay replaced in routine on 25-11-2023 after allocation of new Digital relay (Attested copy of replacement. Moreover, dismantled O/C + E/F CDG-61 relay is lying at 132KV GSS New Wah and tripping can be confirmed from the relay at any time. And the Non-Fatal Accident of Ayesha Bibi occurred on dated 08-08.2023 due to arc flash, Phase - Phase fault and hence relay could not trip due to non-occurrence of short-circuit current Phase - Phase fault according to threshold/Plug settings values.

7. From the medical report the PPMC inquiry committee has concluded that the victim came into physical contact. This contradicts the findings of NEPRA's Inquiry committee. It is pertinent to mention that the PPMC's inquiry report has not mentioned that how the victim came into physical contact with the HT line at a height of about 20 feet.

8. IESCO arranges Khulli Katcheri for redressing the complaints lodged by the general public every complaint lodge at Khulli Katcheri is redressed.

9. The ground clearance of the HT side and the span length is as per the relevant standards and did not cause any harm to anyone. Moreover, IESCO

arranges training and awareness about the operation of various equipment, safety, and first aid to its own employees. Moreover, awareness is created among the general public about the hazards of electricity.

10. IESCO fully complies with the Distribution Design Code and other relevant laws/rules as directed by the august Authority and exercises due diligence in the design of its distribution system.

11. As mentioned in the foregoing paras, IESCO fully adheres to all the relevant codes regarding design, proper operation, safety, and testing of various distribution equipment.

12. IESCO conforms to the instructions given in the Construction Code of Distribution Code, and the installations at the reported site of accident are in accordance with the given Code.


13. Pursuant to the relevant clauses of the Consumer Service Manual, IESCO delivered notice to the consumer for doing illegal construction of the wall at the reported site of accident but to no avail. Moreover, only the authorized employees of IESCO perform maintenance and operation of its equipment and ensures the safety of its own employees.

14. The ground clearance of the line was sufficient at the reported site of an accident in line with the requirements of the Consumer Service Manual.

15. In compliance with the Engineering and Construction Management of the Power Safety Code, the protective system of IESCO at the concerned grid station was adequate to sense the line-to-line short circuit fault and to trip the system. The replacement of old relay with the new digital relay at 11 kV Islampura Feeder was principally meant to modernize our protection system. "

Hearing:

9. The Authority held a hearing for the Licensee under section 27B of NEPRA Act before finalizing the proceedings in the matter. The said the hearing, in the matter of SCN issued to the Licensee, was held on September 19, 2024, wherein, CEO IESCO along with his team, made the following submissions:



- a. For the concerns raised by the Authority about non-implementation of the directions issued by the Authority regarding compensation to the victim, legal counsel of IESCO submitted that IESCO has challenged the said direction in NEPRA Appellate Tribunal and today (19.09.2024), the tribunal has suspended the Authority's directions. Moreover, IESCO has initiated the process of rehabilitation of the victim girl;
- b. CEO IESCO stated that he joined the office recently and he affirmed that he deeply empathized with the condition of the victim and her expected quality of life. Further, there are certain technical & legal aspects in the case which will be covered by the team;
- c. Mr. Jawad Ahmed – Director Safety IESCO asserted that IESCO has already initiated the process of rehabilitation of the victim from Armed Forces Institute of

Rehabilitation & Medicine. The Medical Board has completed the scrutiny of case and forwarded the invoice, which under due process will be get approved from CEO IESCO. Moreover, till the victim reaches the age of 18, the artificial limbs will be replaced after every two years, and that IESCO is making all the efforts possible to help the victim readapt to her environment. He tried to reassure the Authority that IESCO is actively pursuing the rehabilitation process for the victim.


- d. Dir Safety IESCO further submitted that on technical grounds, a flash occurs at around 20,000 °C and causes temperatures high enough to melt metals, and thus IESCO agrees with the findings of the IC on this matter. He also stated that in response to the concern of IC that the protection system did not work effectively, had that been the case, a small voltage is usually sufficient to maintain the arc, and thus the arc would have persisted for a prolonged period.

Findings/Analysis:

10. According to the Licensee, the aforesaid occurrence dated 08.08.2023 came into the knowledge of IESCO through its Operation Circle, Attock, on 02.10.2023 as reported on social media. On the other hand, the eye witness namely Mohammad Shafiq-(Chowkidar) stated before the IC that IESCO officials were present on the site of the accident in the early hours of a morning a few days after the accident, and they corrected the sag of the said line, pointing to the fact that the Licensee was well aware of the incident. Continuing from before, if the submission of the Licensee is assumed to be true, then what prudent actions did the Licensee adopt when getting to know about the accident after two months. It could be established that the Licensee did not conduct an inquiry into the matter nor investigated any of its officials or even consumers to find out the truth. All this cumulatively establishes that the Licensee's submissions are not justified.
11. The Licensee has further submitted that on directions of the Secretary, Ministry of Energy, a committee for probing the alleged occurrence was constituted by Power Planning & Monitoring Company (PPMC) vide letter dated 07.11.2023, in respect of which, PPMC furnished an Inquiry Report dated 28.02.2024 and concluded the inquiry. The Licensee has also highlighted the findings of PPMC that: *"Ayesha Bibi did suffer a severe electric shock from 11kV line, and she had received a direct electric shock from the main wires..... further, PPMC's inquiry report has not mentioned that how the victim came into physical contact with the HIT line at a height of about 20 feet."*

The Authority, after analysing the submissions of the Licensee, observes that the Licensee maybe contradicting itself. On one hand, the Licensee is trying to get support of PPMC inquiry report whereas, on the other hand, the Licensee itself is pointing out the loop holes in inquiry report of PPMC. Rather than relying on the PPMC report and making it in contradiction with the IC Report, the Licensee should have conducted its own inquiry and put forward its own arguments. Furthermore, it is on record that PPMC in its report (para 4.4.1), highlights the negligence of Licensee's safety directorate and its lack of expertise to conduct an investigation. Hence, it can be said that the submissions of the Licensee are baseless;

12. The Licensee has submitted that the annual maintenance shutdown was carried out properly. The said relay was tested during every shutdown with Secondary Injection Test Set and tripping confirmed through VCB and found satisfactory. The said relay tripped regularly in case of fault occurring on the feeder. The Licensee has further



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argued that it procured Digital Type O/C + E/F Relays and same relays were allocated to SS&TL Division vide dated 31-08-2023 and relays were drawn from Regional Store in the month of September-2023. The 11kV O/G Islampura Feeder relay was replaced in routine on 25-11-2023 after allocation of a new Digital relay. Moreover, in compliance with the Engineering and Construction Management of the Power Safety Code, the protective system of IESCO, at the concerned grid station, was adequate to the extent of line-to-line short circuit fault and to trip the system.

The Authority has examined the submissions of the Licensee and observes that the Licensee is trying to justify the replacement of digital relay with CDG old relay on Islampura feeder. However, there is no record of a tripping occurring on the day of the accident despite the touching of lines meaning thereby that there existed line-to-line fault. The CDG relay was replaced by a digital protection relay after the accident with the knowledge that it was not functioning properly. This raises the possibility of a defect or a bypass. It further appears that the CDG relay's protection scheme and trip settings were not configured to a level sufficient for fault detection or were configured incorrectly. Had this replacement of relay been carried out prior to this accident, the said accident could have been avoided.

13. The Licensee has stated that it is in full compliance with the Distribution Design Code and other relevant laws/rules as directed by the Authority and it exercises due diligence in the design of its distribution system. The Licensee has also submitted that it conforms to the instructions given in the Construction Code of Distribution Code, and the installations at the reported site of accident are in accordance with the given Code. The ground clearance of the line was sufficient at the reported site of the accident, in line with the requirements of the Consumer Service Manual. The Licensee has further submitted that pursuant to the relevant clauses of the Consumer Service Manual, it delivered a notice to the consumer regarding illegal construction of the wall at the reported site of accident.

The Authority has considered the submissions of Licensee and observes that Licensee's submissions are unfounded. It is clearly visible from the pictorial evidence presented by the victim's father that the line was sagged before the incident and despite several reminders, the Licensee's staff did not take any action regarding the said complaints and their negligence resulted in the occurrence of the unfortunate accident. If the line was maintained as per SOP, the said accident could have been avoided. As for the delivery of notice of illegal construction of wall from the Licensee to the consumer, the Licensee was unable to prove the receiving of the relevant documents by the consumer.

14. The IC in its report has established the negligence of Licensee based on weather data, including wind speed and wind gusts in Hasan Abdal on the date of the incident i.e., August 8, 2023 from 12:00 pm to 6:00 pm. The maximum wind speed, in the mentioned time, was recorded as 17 km/h from south west at 5:00 pm in Hasan Abdal, marking the highest speed within that 24-hour period on the same date. Due to strong wind, the loose and hanging 11kV conductors swung and were short circuited due to the phase-to-phase contact. This resulted in a generation of an arc flash and sparks fell down at ground near Ayesha Bibi. Although the girl was not in direct physical contact with the energized conductors, but her hands, which were relatively close to the arc flash/generated sparks, were burnt and subsequently needed to be amputated.

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
15. It is a statutory obligation of the Licensee to ensure that its distribution facilities are constructed, operated and maintained in such a manner that they do not become safety hazards for human life. Apparently, the Licensee had not followed the principles and parameters set for prudent utility practices for design of distribution network as laid down in the NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, Distribution Code and Consumer Service Manual. In this regard, reference is made to provisions of relevant NEPRA laws:

NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules
Rule 4(g), Overall Standards 7-Safety

- (i) All distribution facilities of a distribution company shall be constructed, operated, controlled and remained in a manner consistent with the applicable documents.*
- ii) A distribution company shall ensure that its distribution facilities do not cause any leakage of electrical current or step potential beyond a level that can cause harm to human life, as laid down in the relevant IEEE/IEC Standards; prevent accessibility of live conductors or equipment; and prevent development of a situation due to breakdown of equipment which results in voltage or leakage current that can cause harm to human life, property and general public including without limitation, employees and property of the distribution company.*
- iii) A distribution company shall implement suitable, necessary, and appropriate rules, regulations and working practices, as outlined in its Distribution Code or applicable documents, to ensure the safety of its staff and members of the public. This shall also include suitable training for familiarity and understanding of the rules, regulations, practices, and training to use any special equipment that may be required for such purposes including without limitation basic first aid training.*

Distribution Code
SR 4, Safety Management Criteria

- a. *All distribution facilities of a distribution company shall be constructed, operated, controlled and remained in a manner consistent with the applicable documents.*
- b. *A distribution company shall ensure that its distribution facilities do not cause any leakage of Electrical Current or Step Potential beyond a level that can cause harm to human life, as laid down in the relevant IEEE/IEC Standards; prevent accessibility of live conductors or equipment; and prevent development of a situation due to breakdown of equipment which results in voltage or leakage current that can cause harm to human life, property and general public including without limitation, employees and property of the distribution company.*
- c. *A distribution company shall implement suitable, necessary, and appropriate rules, regulations and working practices, as outlined in its Distribution Code or applicable documents, to ensure the safety of its staff and members of the public. This shall also include suitable training for familiarity and understanding of the rules, regulations, practices, and training to use any special equipment that may be required for such purposes including without limitation basic first aid training.*



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Design Criteria for Distribution Lines These criteria shall apply to all distribution and sub-transmission lines and to be operated and maintained by the Licensee up to and including 132kV for both overhead lines and underground cables. The lines shall be designed and constructed in accordance with relevant provisions of IEC Standard or subsequent approved standards applicable to overhead lines and under-ground cables.

3.1 Specification of Equipment, Overhead Lines and Underground Cables

- a. The principles of design, manufacturing, testing and installation of Distribution Equipment, overhead lines and underground cables, including quality requirements, shall conform to applicable standards such as IEC, IEEE, Pakistan Standards or approved current practices of the Licensee.
- b. The specifications of Equipment, overhead lines and cables shall be such as to permit the Operation of the Licensee Distribution System in the following manner;
 - i. within the safety limits as included in the approved Safety Code of the Licensee or the relevant provisions of the Performance Standards (Distribution);

SC 1- System Construction Code

Each Licensee shall prepare a comprehensive and exhaustive Operating / Construction manual in accordance with IESCO approved standard based on relevant international standards like IEC, IEEE, and ASI, Consumer Service Manual, Grid Code and Distribution Code dealing with all material aspects to the design specifications, safe constructing practices, and sound engineering technical principles for construction of Distribution System and connections to consumer installation/system. In particular due regard shall be had for the following but not limited to: -

a. Standard clearance of all voltage lines up to 132kV (vertical as well horizontal) from grounds, buildings, from each other, railway crossing, road crossing etc.

- b. Maximum and minimum length of span of the lines of all the voltages up to 132kV at different locations and different areas.*

Chapter 12 of the Consumer Service Manual obligates each distribution licensee to ensure that its overhead lines, poles, and structures are maintained at a clearance from ground and buildings to avoid any safety hazard. Further distribution licensee is duty-bound to issue notice in case of construction/extension of a building near distribution lines for violation of safety standards as laid down in the Consumer Service Manual and Distribution Code.



Chapter 12 Consumer Service Manual

12.2 Obligations of IESCO

IESCO shall monitor and implement the safety and security plan for consumers. The safety and security objectives can be achieved by adopting good engineering practice, including measures as described below:

12.2.1 Operation and maintenance of IESCO distribution system /Network shall be carried out only by the IESCO authorized and trained personnel.

12.2.2 IESCO system equipment, including overhead lines, poles/structures/towers underground cables, transformers, panels, cutouts, meters, service drops, etc. shall be installed and maintained in accordance with Grid Code, Distribution Code and other relevant documents.

.....
12.2.6 IESCO will issue a notice to the Consumer(s)/Person(s), in case of illegal construction, extension of building under or near the distribution/ transmission lines for violation of safety standards.

12.4 SOME USEFUL SAFETY TIPS

12.4.6 Safe clearances from electricity conductors and equipment (e.g., hazardous extension of balconies at the upper stories of houses in mohallas which comes within close proximity of electric lines) must be maintained to avoid electrocution.

Power Safety Code for Licensees

7.14 Engineering and Construction Management

7.14.2. Identify, install and maintain protective system/distance relays for abnormal conditions (short-circuits, overloading, lines fall on rocks or any dry surface, which may cause damage to people or property, etc.) including grounding of circuits, apparatus and infrastructures. ELCBs (earth leakage circuit breakers), RCDs (residual current devices) and RCCD5 (residual current circuit breakers) shall be used as per design in circuits in order to prevent fires and shocks in electrical installations.

7.14.3. Protective relays and protection schemes set points/sizes should be sufficient for the current rating to immediately 'blow' the fuse or trip the circuit breaker within the specified time, in case of fault or overcurrent.

16. Foregoing in view, the Authority is constrained to believe that the Licensee has failed to construct, operate and maintain its distribution system in accordance with the standards prescribed in Performance Standards, Distribution Code, Power Safety Code, Consumer Service Manual and other applicable documents. Overall, it can be established that the Licensee is responsible for this non-fatal accident, and is in violation of Rule 4(g) of Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, Clause SR 4 – Safety Requirements, Clauses DDC 2.2 & DDC 3 of Distribution Design Code and Clause SC 1 of System Construction Code of Distribution Code, Chapter 12 of the Consumer Service Manual and Clause 7.14 of Power Safety Code read with Section 21(2)f of the NEPRA Act, Article 11 of the terms and conditions of Licensee's Distribution Licensee.

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


Decision

17. After due deliberations and taking into account the submissions/arguments made by the Licensee and in light of the NEPRA Act and other applicable documents, the Authority is of the considered opinion that the Licensee has failed to provide any satisfactory reply to the Show Cause Notice served to it, therefore, the Authority hereby decides to impose a fine amounting to PKR 200,000,000/- (Two Hundred Million) on the Licensee on account of its negligence resulting into the occurrence of a non-fatal accident of Ms. Aeysha Bibi, resident of Manu Nagar Kachi Abadi, Hasan Abdal, District Attock.
18. The Licensee is directed to pay the fine amount of PKR 200,000,000/- (Two Hundred Million) in designated bank of the Authority within a period of 15 days from the date of issuance of this order and forward a copy of the paid instrument to the Registrar Office for information, failing which the Authority may recover the amount due under section 41 of the NEPRA Act as arrears of the land revenue or through any other appropriate legal means in addition to taking any other appropriate legal action against the Licensee for non-compliance.

AUTHORITY


Rafique Ahmed Shaikh
Member (Technical)




Engr. Maqsood Anwar Khan
Member (Licensing)



Mathar Niaz Rana (nsc)
Member (Tariff)



Amina Ahmed
Member (Law)



Waseem Mukhtar
Chairman



Dated December 05, 2024

